A Machine Learning Approach for Prediction of Signaling SIP Dialogs by Pereira, Diogo et al.
Received February 28, 2021, accepted March 9, 2021, date of publication March 12, 2021, date of current version March 25, 2021.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3065660
A Machine Learning Approach for Prediction of
Signaling SIP Dialogs
DIOGO PEREIRA 1, RODOLFO OLIVEIRA 1,2, (Senior Member, IEEE),
AND HYONG S. KIM3, (Senior Member, IEEE)
1Departamento de Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, FCT, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica,
Portugal
2Instituto de Telecomunicações, 1049-001 Lisbon, Portugal
3Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
Corresponding author: Rodolfo Oliveira (rado@fct.unl.pt)
This work was supported in part by the European Regional Development Fund (FEDER), through the Competitiveness and
Internationalization Operational Programme (COMPETE 2020) of the Portugal 2020, Programa Operacional Regional LISBOA
(LISBOA2020), in part by the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), through projects InfoCent-IoT under Grant
POCI-01-0145-FEDER-030433, and in part by the CoSHARE under Grant LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-0307095, Grant
PTDC/EEI-TEL/30709/2017, and Grant UIDB/EEA/50008/2020.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a machine learning methodology for prediction of signaling sessions
established with the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). Given the increasing importance of predicting and
detecting abnormal sequences of SIP messages to avoid SIP signaling-based attacks, we first propose a
Bayesian inference method capable of representing the statistical relation between a SIP message, observed
by a SIP user agent or a SIP server, and prior trustworthy SIP dialogs. The Bayesian inference method,
a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) enriched with n−gram Markov observations, is updated over time, so the
inference can be used in real-time. The HMM is then used for predicting and detecting SIP dialogs through
a lightweight implementation of Viterbi algorithm for sparse state spaces. Experimental results are also
reported, where a SIP dataset representing prior information collected by a SIP user agent and/or a SIP
server is used to predict or detect if a received sequence of SIPmessages is legitimate according to similar SIP
dialogs already observed. Finally, we discuss the results obtained for a dataset of abnormal SIP sequences,
not observed during the inference stage, showing the effective utility of the proposed methodology to detect
abnormal SIP sequences in a short period of time.
INDEX TERMS Session initiation protocol, hidden Markov chains, Bayesian networks, machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) has been
massively adopted for establishing and controlling commu-
nication sessions that support multimedia services, including
but not limited to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) [1]
or IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) services over cellular
networks [2], [3]. The growing adoption of the SIP protocol
has motivated the development of analytical tools capable
of diagnosing and/or identifying potential problems caused
by inconsistent SIP signaling. It is well reported in the lit-
erature that a significant number of SIP vulnerabilities is
related to the exploitation of SIP weaknesses found in the
protocol itself, or in the implementation [4], [5]. By exploring
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yulei Wu .
combinations of different signaling patterns, the attackers can
cause denial-of-service, unauthorized access to a call, billing
errors, and others [6]. Consequently, it is of high importance
identifying potential malicious SIP signaling sequences at
the SIP servers, or new signaling sequences never observed
before that can represent new attacks. While the already
known potential malicious sequences can be detected or pre-
dicted in an automatedway, the SIP sequences never observed
before also need to be detected to be analyzed by domain
experts who can then assess their level of vulnerability. The
detection and prediction of those SIP signaling sequences
can then be used by the SIP servers to act according to their
vulnerability severity, avoiding attacks.
The detection and/or prediction of specific SIP signaling
sequences is a challenging topic due to the high number of
different signaling sequences and because its length is not
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constant. The high number of sequences increases the state
space of sequences, increasing the detection or prediction
computation time. The non-constant length of the sequences
degrade the detection/prediction performance, because a long
signaling sequence can contain a short sequence at the begin-
ning, and both sequences can be legitimate until more infor-
mation is known that can distinguish them.
In recent years, the adoption of machine learning and data
mining techniques has been massively adopted in several
areas of interest, due to the increase in processing power and
to the scientific breakthroughs in data science.Machine learn-
ing has also being adopted in the telecommunications arena
[7], [8], as it can bring many advantages in the processing
of bulks of data that are generated by a plethora of different
sources. Multiple tools have already been proposed to prevent
SIP attacks caused by SIP message payload tampering [9],
[10], and SIP message flooding [11], [12]. However, the
attacks caused by SIP message flow tampering, a.k.a. attacks
based on SIP signaling [6], have received limited attention
and, as far as we know, the prediction or detection of SIP
signaling patterns as a given SIP agent/server receives the
sequential SIP messages has not been addressed before.
In this work, we are motivated by the advantages of
adopting machine learning techniques to predict and avoid
vulnerabilities caused by the SIP signaling patterns gener-
ated by the multiple agents that support multimedia com-
munication sessions. Admitting that a SIP server, or a
SIP agent, has access to all SIP messages as they occur
over time, we propose a methodology that is capable
of predicting or detecting the type of SIP signaling pat-
tern when a sequential set of messages is already known.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows:
• An inference model is proposed to associate the already
known SIP signaling patterns to the observed SIP mes-
sages. The association is represented through a hidden
Markovmodel, where the number of known SIP patterns
can increase over time, so it can dynamically incor-
porate more knowledge as more signaling patterns are
observed;
• Each sequence of SIP messages observed by a SIP
server/agent is represented by a n−gram, a form of a
(n−1)-order Markov model, so we are able to represent
the likelihood of observing a n−th SIP message given
that the previous n−1 SIP messages are already known.
Additionally, due to the properties of the n−gram to
distinguish shorter observations included in longer ones,
the prediction achieves high accuracy even for short
patterns of SIP messages that can be found in multiple
and different SIP dialogs;
• A modified version of the Viterbi algorithm is used to
compute the predicted SIP signaling pattern given the set
of observed SIP messages. The algorithm is designed to
address data sparsity efficiently;
• We present extensive experimental results to evaluate
the performance of the proposed methodology using a
SIP dataset available in the community [13]. Starting
with a brief characterization of the dataset, we assess
the detection probability when all messages of the SIP
pattern are observed, and the prediction probability as
a function of the SIP messages already observed so far.
Several results are given to demonstrate the capacity of
the proposed method to identify unknown/abnormal SIP
patterns, showing that it can be effectively adopted in
practical systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief
overview of the SIP protocol and its vulnerabilities and solu-
tions to avoid attacks is given in Section II, based on theworks
already published so far. Section III introduces the method-
ology to build the inference model. The prediction scheme
is presented in IV. The dataset and the results used to eval-
uate the prediction methodology are presented in V. Finally,
conclusions and future work are discussed in Section VI.
Regarding the notation adopted in this work, we use
P(X = x) to represent the probability of X , and FX (x)
to represent the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF).
Vectors are represented in lower case, upright boldface type,
e.g. x. Matrices are represented in upper case upright bold-
face type, e.g., X, being the element at row i and column j
represented by xi,j. A vector of k elements is represented by
v = {v1, v2, . . . , vk}. A vector of k consecutive (ordered)
elements, also denominated a sequence, is denoted by
v = <v(1), v(2), . . . , v(k)>. The notation v[m] is used to
denote the m-th element of v. Sets and the state spaces are
represented in calligraphic font, e.g., S.
II. RELATED WORK
This section presents a brief overview of the SIP protocol, its
vulnerabilities, and the most representative works proposed
to mitigate the different types of vulnerabilities.
A. SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL
The Session Initiation Protocol [14] has been extensively
deployed to support multimedia sessions, including but not
limited to signaling of IMS services and VoIP and video
services over cellular and fixed networks. The vulnerabilities
of SIP are well documented in the literature [4]–[6]. Despite
the adoption of multiple security mechanisms, SIP services
can suffer different types of attacks that can cause service
interruption, service destruction, or unauthorized access to
previously reserved computing resources or pools of SIP
services.
SIP [14] is an application-layer protocol designed to ini-
tiate, terminate and change multimedia sessions created by
peers of user agents. To perform these interactions a series of
SIP messages must be exchanged between each user agent.
SIP is similar to HTTP and SMTP protocols, where each
message can be either a request or a response.
When a user agent requests a certain interaction to occur,
e.g. start a session or register in a server, first, a SIP message
must be sent with a request that can be identified by a specific
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method (six methods are defined in [14], although standard-
ized SIP extensions can define more). In response to one of
those methods, a response SIP message is sent with a reply
code, i.e., a three-digit number categorized into six classes
(Provisional, Success, Redirection, Client Error, Server Error,
and Global Failure).
Every SIP request exchanged between two or more user
agents initiates a SIP transaction. A SIP transaction includes
a single SIP request and any responses to it. Multiple SIP
transactions exchanged between two peers form a SIP dia-
log, which represents the peer-to-peer relationship over time.
Through the utilization of dialog IDs, a user agent can identify
the different dialogs. The dialog is identified by three distinct
elements: a Call ID, i.e., a unique identifier for every message
on the actual dialog, a local tag, and a remote tag. The tags
contain the Unique Resource Identifier (URI) from the sender
and receiver user agent.
B. SIP VULNERABILITIES
The types of reported SIP attacks caused by different vul-
nerabilities are usually categorized as [6]: flooding attacks;
malformed-SIP message attacks; authentication attacks; and
SIP signaling attacks. The majority of works published so far
are mainly focused on flooding attacks, malformed-SIP mes-
sage attacks, and authentication attacks. SIP signaling attacks
have not deserved too much attention due to the complexity
of the detection of the sequential signaling data in real-time
and the large diversity of messages and SIP dialogs. The next
paragraphs introduce the different types of SIP attacks and
the exploited vulnerabilities that cause them.
SIP service interruption can be caused byflooding attacks,
where a massive number of SIP requests are sent to SIP
servers that are unable to process them. Different techniques
have been proposed to avoid SIP flooding attacks, including
threshold-based solutions that compare the traffic patterns
occurring over time with the statistics of the network in nor-
mal operation [12]. The statistics can be described in a single
dimension [12], or in multiple dimensions, the latter being
more interesting to detect low rate flooding attacks [11]. SIP
parser vulnerabilities can also be explored to deploy flooding
attacks, where some fields of the SIP messages are changed
to deplete the servers’ processing power and unnecessarily
long fields can be added to the headers to increase network
utilization and service delay. An approach to mitigate parser-
based flooding attacks is proposed in [15], where the authors
recommend to not parse the SIP messages before passing
them through a message classifier system that predicts the
true class of each message and can simply drop them if they
are suspicious.
The majority of literature on SIP anomaly detection is
particularly oriented to malformed-SIP message attacks
[16], which explore SIP parser vulnerabilities. The detection
of malformed SIP messages has been studied in multiple
works, since attacks may be attempted by simply changing
the text-based SIP message headers. Malicious SIP messages
are usually detected through intrusion detection systems
(e.g. firewalls) [17], learning techniques [18], and/or iden-
tification of deviations from a priori statistics [9]. In [10]
support-vector-machine classifiers were adopted to label
incoming SIP messages as good or bad. A SIP message
lexical analysis was developed to filter the messages that are
not formed according to the standard and in a second stage
a semantic filter was applied to the stream of the surviving
messages to remove syntactic errors.
Apart from flooding and malformed-SIP messages attacks,
authentication attacks are also of high importance [19].
In the authentication attacks several vulnerabilities of the
authentication protocols are explored. Multiple schemes have
been proposed to reduce the existing SIP authentication vul-
nerabilities, including password-based one-factor authentica-
tion [20], [21], two-factor authentication based on password
and smart cards [22], [23], and three-factor authentication that
includes biometric data [24], [25].
In addition to the types of attacks already mentioned, the
attackers can also explore additional vulnerabilities related to
the protocols’ signaling logic and take advantage of defec-
tive implementations of the protocol in the servers and user
agents. These types of attacks are known as SIP signaling
attacks and explore possible protocol implementation errors
by sending SIP messages to allow improper authentication
mechanisms. These attacks include the ‘‘BYE-attack’’, the
‘‘CANCEL-attack’’, the ‘‘REFER-attack’’, and many others
described in [6]. A common feature in these attacks is the
possibility of capturing its ‘‘signature’’ through the pattern of
SIP messages exchanged over the SIP servers. Several rule-
based approaches, such as the one presented in [26], were
proposed to mitigate SIP signaling vulnerabilities by captur-
ing the contextual information in the SIP traffic, that is further
used to construct event graphs to bematchedwith the protocol
activities. These solutions explore known ‘‘signatures’’ that
can be used further to policy the protocol. Themain limitation
of the ‘‘signature’’ based approach is the fact that the attacks
can be perpetrated through new signatures, thus requiring
dynamic algorithms that need to adapt to legitimate new
signaling patterns. The solution proposed in this paper is a
first-step to predict and detect such kinds of signatures, which
can effectively be used to assess the vulnerability level as the
SIP sessions are deployed in real-time. The SIP signaling
vulnerabilities have also motivated the authors in [27] to pro-
pose a SIP automatic debugger tool to verify the compliance
of SIP interoperability, being capable of analyzing the SIP
messages flow and group them into dialogs to find proto-
cols’ compliance and interoperability faults. The mitigation
of SIP signaling attacks was also addressed in [28], where the
SIP operation is modeled as a discrete event system where
the state transitions of the SIP dialog are described through
a probabilistic counting deterministic timed automata. The
description includes the characterization of the SIP sequences
and their timings, which are used a posterior to detect devia-
tions from the models.
We emphasize that the number of potential SIP dialogs is
somehow constrained in normal operation. However, in SIP
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signaling attacks the malicious users explore the creation
of new SIP dialogs that can take advantage of defective
protocol implementations which are not observed during
regular/normal operation. Although the number of different
types of SIP messages is low, its combination in a SIP dia-
log can reach a high number of different patterns because
the length of the SIP dialog is not limited. Moreover, the
request/response is also not so deterministic, because for
particular requests there are provisional responses that are
sent back by servers according to the delays observed to
process the requests, which can originate several responses
to the same request.
Asmentioned before the attacks can be perpetrated through
new signatures, thus requiring dynamic algorithms that need
to adapt to legitimate new signaling patterns. Contrarily to
works in [26]–[28], we do not assume a fixed probabilistic
model of the SIP operation or fixed rules that describe the
SIP activity. Instead, we are interested in capturing the SIP
messages to characterize the SIP dialogs during a dynamic
probabilistic inference stage (presented in Section III), which
can then be used as input to predict the SIP dialogs and/or
indicate unknown dialogs that need to be categorized by
domain experts. In this way, our goal is to learn from the
captured data to assess the vulnerability of future SIP activ-
ities based on prior data and in an automated way. Conse-
quently, the proposed method is designed assuming that new
signatures can be identified, which can be further included
in the knowledge base at any time. The dynamic detection
and inclusion of new signatures improves the static schemes
proposed so far in the literature, where the set of signatures is
predefined and based on rules obtained from domain experts
and not from information automatically detected without
human intervention.
III. INFERENCE MODEL FOR SIP SIGNALING PATTERNS
This section presents a model to infer the signaling patterns
from SIP messages. We propose a Hidden Markov Model
that also includes a Markov model associated with the obser-
vations, to represent the relationship between the signaling
patterns and the observed SIP messages. The model is used
to infer the specific probabilistic properties of the signaling
patterns. The inference model is used by the estimation algo-
rithm, presented in Section IV, to detect signaling patterns
when all required information is known (a complete informa-
tion problem), or to predict the signaling pattern when only
incomplete information is available.
A. PROBABILISTIC MODEL
Henceforth, we consider that all SIP servers and user agents
in the SIP signaling path capture the SIP messages to infer the
SIP statistics and also predict or detect the SIP dialogs. In this
way, it is possible to predict and detect new dialogs that may
constitute new vulnerabilities. The proposed inference model
captures the relation between the observed SIP messages and
the signaling patterns. The model is updated whenever a new
SIP dialog is captured by a SIP server or an user agent,
depending on where the model is used.
The modeling approach followed in this work is based
on a Hidden Markov Model. The HMM is capable of mod-
eling the probability of occurring an unobservable hidden
state, dk ∈ S, and the conditional probabilities of occur-
ring observable events (observations), nk ∈ O, for each
hidden state. Consequently, the observable events can be
used to learn about the hidden states. Next, we introduce
multiple concepts required to derive the model. A table
of the symbols is given in Table 1 to introduce the
notation.
TABLE 1. Table of symbols.
We start with the definition of a SIP message.
Definition 1: A SIP message mk , k ∈ M =
{1, 2, . . . ,M}, represents a specific type of SIP request or SIP
response. The total number of SIP requests plus responses is
denoted by M, and M represents the set of all types of SIP
messages.
A SIP dialog is composed by SIP messages and is defined
as follows.
Definition 2: A SIP dialog is a sequence of consecutive
SIP messages represented by dk = <m(1),m(2), . . . ,m(Ld )>,
where m(j) represents the j-th message of the SIP dialog. Ld
represents the SIP dialog length. All SIP messages contained
in a SIP dialog share the same SIP Call ID, and sender and
receiver URIs.
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Given the number of possible SIP methods in a request and
possible reply codes in a response, the number of different
dialogs that can be created between the user agents is high.
Besides that, the dialogs can be legitimate or anomalous.
In a SIP user agent or SIP server, the observations (inputs)
are the captured SIP messages, while the unobservable data
is related with the signaling patterns, i.e. the SIP dialogs (out-
put) to detect or predict. Regarding the observations, they are
defined as follows.
Definition 3: An observation k taken by an user agent or a
SIP server is a sequence of consecutive SIP messages repre-
sented by ok = <m(1),m(2), . . . ,m(Lo)>. Each SIP message
is represented by m(h) = mi, i ∈ M, h ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Lo}.
The symbol Lo represents the length of the observation. All
SIP messages contained in an observation share the same SIP
Call ID.
The observations of length Lo = 1 represent the special
case when each observation is exactly the last SIP message
captured during the progress of a SIP dialog. However, for
Lo > 1, we consider that all Lo SIP messages are repre-
sented by an observation Markov model of Lo − 1 order
with probability P(XL0 = m
(Lo)|X1 = m(1), . . . ,XLo−1 =
m(Lo−1)), where the random variable Xj represents the j-th
SIP message in ok , 1 ≤ j ≤ Lo. In this work, we adopt the
n-gram probabilistic model [29] as the observation Markov
model.
Definition 4: A n-gram nk associated to the observation
ok , is an ordered vector of sequences of length n, obtained
through a sliding window of length n over the zero padded
sequence 0 = < 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)
, ok , 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)
> of length
2(n − 1) + Lo. Each sequence of length n is denoted by 3.
The state space of the n-gram nk is formed by all sequences3
when the sliding window is displaced 1 unit over the sequence
0, resulting in a space of γ = (n−1)+Lo sequences. Finally,
the n-gram is written as nk = <3(1),3(2), . . . , 3(γ )>.
The representation of an observation ok as an ordered
vector of γ sequences 3, i.e., the adoption of the n-gram
model allows the association of a probability for each of the
γ sequences observed in a consecutive way. Consequently,
each displacement of the sliding window over 0 is condi-
tioned on prior n − 1 elements. Additionally, because n − 1
consecutive zero elements are considered in the head and
tail of 0, an observation oa contained in a longer sequence
ob can be univocally represented by a n-gram na, allow-
ing to distinguish shorter observations included in longer
ones.
Definition 5: The observation space, denoted by O,
is formed by the set of n-grams of the permuta-
tions (with repetition) of the Lo SIP messages integrat-
ing each observation ok . Since the permutations sum
up MLo , i.e., O = {n1, . . . ,nk}, k = MLo , and
each nk n-gram contains γ sequences 3, the maxi-





1 , . . . , 3
(γ )




k , . . . , 3
(γ )
k >,
k = MLo .
Regarding the dimension of the observation space, it is
noteworthy to mention the importance of the n-gram length
(n). As mentioned before, the state space of the n-gram nk is
formed by all sequences 3, resulting in the space formed by
γ = (n − 1) + Lo sequences. Consequently, the dimension
of the observation space, given by γMLo, increases with n,
showing the influence of the n-gram length on the computa-
tional costs associated with operations over the observation
space.
The definitions of the hidden states, the HMM, as well as
the HMM transition matrix, emission matrix, and distribution
are next introduced.
Definition 6: The hidden states space is represented by
S = {d1,d2, . . . ,dN }, where N stands for the total number
of unique SIP dialogs (hidden states).
Definition 7: The pair of discrete-time stochastic pro-
cesses represented by the random variables (Sk ,Ok ), Sk ∈ S ,
Ok ∈ O, where k ≥ 1 represents the discrete-time index, is a
hidden Markov model, if Sk represents the non-observable
(hidden) Markov process, and the conditional probability
P(Ok ∈ O|S1, . . . , Sk ) = P(Ok ∈ O|Sk = dk ) is defined
over the observable state space O.
Definition 8: The transition matrix of the hidden Markov
chain is denoted by A, defined by the probabilities ai,j =
P(Sk+1 = dj|Sk = di), where Sk is a random variable
describing the hidden state at discrete time k, and 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
1 ≤ j ≤ N.
Definition 9: The emission matrix of the hidden Markov
chain is denoted by B, defined by the probabilities bi,j =
P(Ok = 3j|Sk = di), with 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤∑Ldmax
k=1 [(n − 1) + k]M
k , and Ldmax represents the maximum
length of a SIP dialog.
Next, we define the distribution of the hidden Markov
chain at a given discrete time.
Definition 10: The distribution of the hidden Markov
chain at the discrete time instant k is represented by 5k =
{π1, . . . , πN }, where {π1, . . . , πN } represents the probabili-




B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INFERENCE MODEL
The inference model is computed for each SIP dialog con-
tained in a dataset 2 = {d1,d2, . . . ,dm}, m ≥ N , of
legitimate SIP dialogs. The following steps are required to
compute the inference model:
1) If a SIP dialog dk ∈ 2 has never been inferred before
it is included in the hidden states space S;
2) Each SIP dialog dk ∈ 2 is seen as an observation and
the corresponding n-gram nk is computed according
to Definition 4. The n-gram identifies the sequence
3(1), . . . , 3(γ ) and, for each3 a corresponding counter
is incremented. The counters are then used to update the
probability values in the emission matrix B, to describe
how likely is to observe the n-gram nk when a SIP
dialog dk occurs;
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3) The dataset is run from d1 to dm to compute the prob-
abilities ai,j of the transition matrix A.
The dataset is used to identify the unique dialogs, which
also represent the number of HMM hidden states, i.e., N .
The SIP standard (RFC) [14] is used to identify the number
of observable SIP messages, i.e. M . The different types of
SIP request and SIP responses are univocally translated to
integer values. To compute the transition matrix A we have
considered that a transition occurs whenever a SIP message is
transmitted, so there will be Ld−1 transitions per SIP dialog.
Regarding the emission matrix, it is computed by counting
the number of occurrences of each sequence3 computed for
each SIP dialog.
We highlight that B is a sparse matrix. Admitting
that the longest SIP dialog in the dataset has length
Ldmax , the maximum dimension of matrix B would be
N ×
∑Ldmax
k=1 [(n − 1) + k]M
k , as indicated in Definition 9.
This means that the maximum number of the matrix columns
must take into account the longest SIP dialogs, i.e., the ones
containing the highest number of SIPmessages. However, the
great majority of SIP dialogs are shorter, i.e., they are formed
by less than Ldmax SIP messages. For a specific dialog dk
of length Ld < Ldmax , the number of non-null probabilities
to update in B is only (n − 1) + Ld , because the specific
dialog is formed by less SIP messages than the longest one
and contains a single combination of Ld SIP messages. Con-
sequently, while the maximum number of columns of B is∑Ldmax
k=1 [(n − 1) + k]M
k , for a specific SIP dialog of length
Ld only (n − 1) + Ld columns need to be updated. This fact
shows that the implementation of B can make use of efficient
data structures where only (n− 1)+ Ld elements need to be
stored for each of the N hidden states.
IV. PREDICTION OF SIP DIALOGS
In this section we describe how to predict or detect the most
likely SIP dialog. The computation of the prediction and
detection algorithm is based on an input sequence of SIP
messages, as described in Definition 11.
Definition 11: The observed input sequence is repre-
sented by the observation i = <m(1), . . . ,m(Lo)>,Lo ≤ Ld .
The prediction algorithm is based on the well known
Viterbi algorithm [30] adapted to the n-gram observation
model. The algorithm contains two phases: the forward and
the backward stages, which are presented in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm uses the transition matrix, A, the emission
matrix, B, and the space of hidden states, S, computed in the
inference stage. The distribution of the hidden Markov chain,
50, is the inferred HMM distribution when the algorithm is
run.
In line 1 the γ sequences 3 are built considering the input
vector i, so the n-gram model is applied to the observed
input sequence. The ‘‘find’’ function in lines 2 and 9 finds
the index of a particular sequence 3 contained in O. In the
forward stage (lines 2 to 11) the probability of each hidden
state, T1, is computed for each sequence 3(j), 1 ≤ j ≤ γ .
Algorithm 1 Prediction Algorithm
Input: i, 50, S,A,B
Output: x =< d(1), . . . ,d(γ ) > F Viterbi Path
1: nk = build_n-gram_sequences (i) F build nk for i
2: k = find(nk [1],O) F find 3(1) index in O
3: F Forward Stage:
4: for each state i = 1, 2, . . . ,N do
5: T1[i, 1]← 50(i) · bi,k
6: T2[i, 1]← 0
7: end for
8: for each 3(j) sequence in nk , j = 2, . . . , γ do
9: k = find (nk [j],O)
10: for each state i = 1, 2, . . . ,N do
11: T1[i, j]← max
1≤s≤N
(T1[s, j− 1] · as,i · bi,k )
12: T2[i, j]← arg max
1≤s≤N
(T1[s, j− 1] · as,i · bi,k )
13: end for
14: end for
15: if T1[:, γ ] == 0 then return x =<>
16: end if
17: F Backward Stage:
18: sγ ← arg max
1≤s≤N
(T1[s, γ ])
19: d(γ )← S[sγ ]
20: for j = γ, . . . , 2 do





The computations form a Viterbi Trellis represented in Fig-
ure 1, where each observable input is represented by a square
and each hidden state by a circle. Having computed the
Viterbi Trellis, the algorithm computes in the backward stage
the optimal sequence of hidden states x = <d(1), . . . ,d(γ )>,
defined as the Viterbi path as follows.
Definition 12: The Viterbi path, x = <d(1), . . . ,d(γ )>,
is the most likely sequence of predicted hidden states for the
observed input sequence i.
The two stages of the algorithm are equivalent to compute
the shortest path for the observed input sequence based on the
inferred transition, emission, and initial distribution matrices.
In some cases, the Viterbi path might be empty (condition
in line 15 of the algorithm). In this case the algorithm is
unable to compute the complete path because the observed
input messages and/or the hidden states transition have null
probabilities.
Given that the output of the estimation algorithm has
dimension γ , i.e., it can contain multiple SIP dialogs, we pro-
pose two different methods to compute the estimated SIP
dialog. A SIP dialog might be predicted according to the
criteria presented in definitions 13 or 14.
Definition 13 (Equal-Dialog Criterion (EdC)): Given the
Viterbi path x = <d(1), . . . ,d(γ )>, the SIP dialog is only
predicted when all dialogs d(1), . . . ,d(γ ) in x are equal.
Otherwise, no SIP dialog is predicted.
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FIGURE 1. Viterbi trellis.
Definition 14 Most Frequent Dialog Criterion (MFdC):
Given the Viterbi path x = <d(1), . . . ,d(γ )>, the predicted
SIP dialog is the most frequent dialog in x. In case of a tie no
SIP dialog is predicted.
When the observed input sequence i has length Lo < Ld ,
only a part of the SIP dialog is observed and, consequently,
the algorithm predicts the SIP dialog. In the special case when
Lo = Ld , the algorithm acts as a detector of the SIP dialog.
One disadvantage of the Viterbi algorithm is its computa-
tional complexity, a topic explored in [31], [32]. In our case
the Viterbi algorithm runs in timeO(γMLo N 2). AlthoughM ,
the number of different SIP messages, is low, and the same
can hold true for Lo and γ , the number of different dialogs,N ,
is usually high. However, if the emission or transition matri-
ces are sparse, i.e., less than 50% of its elements are non-zero
values, the computation time can be reduced. Algorithm 1 is
computed for the N unique SIP dialogs observed during the
inference stage. For a specific dialog dk , only γ = (n−1)+Lo
computations are required to update T1 and T2, instead of
γMLo in the Viterbi algorithm. This is because no computa-
tions are required for the entire observation state spaceO, but
only for the elements of the space found in the observed input
sequence i. Consequently, the computational complexity of
the proposed algorithm isO(γ N 2), representing a significant
computational gain.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section characterizes the performance of the detec-
tion and prediction algorithms. The capability of detecting
unknown SIP dialogs is also validated.
A. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY AND DATASETS
The purpose of the experimental methodology followed in the
next subsections is to assess the capacity of classifying an
observed and already inferred dialog in the correct SIP dialog
(objective (a)), but also assess the capacity of detecting SIP
dialogs not inferred so far (objective (b)), denominated as
unknown SIP dialogs.
Both objectives are important from the point of view of
hypothetical attacks. Objective (a) can be used to classify
dialogs that have been inferred so far and are already
labeled as safe, abnormal, or according to different vulner-
ability rank labels. In this case, it is important to classify the
observed messages in the correct SIP dialog, so that harm-
ful SIP dialogs can be effectively recognized. Consequently,
in the experimental methodology, the probability of detection
and prediction is only computed for the SIP dialogs inferred
so far. We highlight that this goal is mainly related to the fact
that the SIP dialogs inferred so far can be mis-detected due
to the different lengths of the SIP dialogs because a longer
dialog can contain a shorter one and without using the n-gram
technique the Viterbi algorithm was only capable of detect-
ing the shorter one or the longer one (not both). Regarding
objective (b) it is particularly important to detect unknown
SIP dialogs not inferred so far because it can represent a
new type of attack. While in objective (a) the outcome of
the detection is always a non-null Viterbi path, indicating
a correct or incorrect SIP dialog, in objective (b) the goal is
to validate the detection of unknown SIP dialogs not inferred
so far through the null Viterbi path outcome. To this end,
the experimental methodology is conducted in the following
order:
• In Subsection V-B we analyze the n-gram performance
to distinguish shorter SIP dialogs that can be contained
in longer ones. Particularly, we characterize the influ-
ence of the parameter n to classify the SIP dialogs
inferred so far and on in its computation time;
• Subsection V-C addresses objective (a) by characteriz-
ing the classification performance of the SIP dialogs
already inferred so far;
• Finally, Subsection V-D addresses objective (b) by
showing the capability of detecting unknown SIP
dialogs.
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FIGURE 2. Histogram of the length of the unique SIP dialogs.
Next we characterize the datasets used in the experiments.
The performance evaluation is based on the SIP dataset cre-
ated by Nassar et al. [13]. The dataset uses two types of
open source SIP servers: Asterisk [33] and Opensips [34].
They include information about the URI of both sender and
receiver user agent, the messages sent, the number of packets,
the timestamp of each SIP dialog, and the final SIP session
state, i.e., if the call was successful, rejected, or canceled.
To identify each SIP dialog in the dataset we have used
information about the URI user agent, the SIP messages sent,
and the timestamp of each SIP dialog. The different types of
SIPmessages were encoded as integer values. In what follows
we denominate this dataset as the non-anomalous dataset.
The non-anomalous dataset contains a total of 18782 SIP
dialogs established between a group of 249 user agents, which
corresponds to 1492 unique SIP dialogs, i.e. the number
of hidden states N . The majority of the 1492 unique SIP
dialogs, 66.23%, only occur once, which may result in lower
prediction performance due to its low occurrence probability.
A histogram of the SIP dialog lengths is plotted in Figure 2
for the unique 1492 SIP dialogs. As can be seen the longest
SIP dialog is formed by 56 SIP messages. There is a higher
concentration of SIP dialogs with length between 3 and 30,
and longer SIP dialogs are less likely to occur. A higher
number of dialogs with length 15, 17, and 19, are observed.
While the results in Figure 2 report the histogram obtained
for the 1492 different types of dialogs, in Figure 3 we char-
acterize the histogram of the SIP dialog lengths considering
the 18782 SIP dialogs included in the non-anomalous dataset,
which containmultiple occurrences of the unique SIP dialogs.
The results in Figure 3 show two peaks for the dialogs with
length 3 and 14 and indicate that the distribution of the
dialogs in the entire dataset is not so concentrated for shorter
lengths as it is when only unique SIP dialogs are considered.
However, both have a huge concentration of dialogs with
length 3.
Nassar et al. [13] also made available another dataset con-
taining 152 unique SIP dialogs representing attacks, which
FIGURE 3. Histogram of the length of all SIP dialogs in the dataset.
we denominate as the anomalous dataset. We highlight that
none of the SIP dialogs contained in the anomalous dataset is
contained in the non-anomalous dataset.
The non-anomalous dataset was divided into two differ-
ent datasets, the inference dataset and the test dataset.
The test dataset was formed by the last 20% of each user
agent’s SIP dialogs while the inference dataset contained
the remaining 80%. The computation of A, B, and 5, was
based on the dialogs’ distribution of the inference dataset. In
Subsection V-D the results reported with the test dataset have
followed a cross-validation k-fold methodology, by creating
5 different inference and test datasets over the non-anomalous
dataset.
Finally, the inference model and the prediction algo-
rithm was implemented in Matlab running in a 64bit Win-
dows 10 OS system over an Intel Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU
@ 2.20GHz with 8 GB of RAM and a GeForce 840M GPU.
B. IMPACT OF THE n-GRAM LENGTH
In this subsection we evaluate the impact of the n−gram
sequences length (n) in the detection performance and detec-
tion computation times.
Regarding the experimental methodology, in the evaluation
process we vary n from 1 to 56, which corresponds to the
range of the SIP dialogs length contained in the dataset. The
HMM model was inferred for each sequence length value
using the inference dataset. Then, the SIP dialogs contained in
both inference and test datasets were detected by considering
each SIP dialog in the dataset as an observed input sequence,
i, in Algorithm 1. In this way, we evaluate the capacity
of detecting the different SIP dialogs of both datasets for
different n−gram sequences length.
The detection results are plotted in Figure 4 for the differ-
ent EdC/MFdC detection criteria. The detection of the SIP
dialogs increases with n because the Markov order of the
observations increases and the likelihood of distinguishing
shorter dialogs included in longer dialogs also increases. The
results show that the detection rate of the SIP dialogs in the
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FIGURE 4. Detection performance for different n-gram sequence
lengths (n).
FIGURE 5. Average detection computation time per SIP dialog for
different n-gram emission matrices.
inference dataset is 100% for n = 13, which is an important
value because it indicates that the proposed algorithm is able
to detect all types of SIP dialogs using the inference dataset,
even the shortest ones included in longer SIP dialogs. The
detection results are slightly higher for the MFdC (the EdC
achieves 0.9927, and the MFdC achieves 1.0000).
The choice of the n-gram sequence length, n, cannot be
made only taking into consideration the detection perfor-
mance, because the n-gram sequence length influences the
computational complexity of the detection algorithm. Fig-
ure 5 presents the average computation time to detect each
SIP dialog for the different values of n. Longer n-gram
sequences increase the observation space, resulting in higher
average computation times. However, for smaller n values
the computation time also increases due to the fact that more
observation states are returned by the function ‘‘find’’ in
the algorithm, resulting in more non-null probabilities of the
emission and transition matrices that need to be considered in
the computation process. From the results in Figures 4 and 5,
we have parameterized the length of the n-gram sequences
to 13, since it represents the best trade-off between the
FIGURE 6. CDF of the detection times of the non-anomalous dataset
(n = 13).
detection performance and computation time (approximately
243ms per SIP dialog). All the experimental results presented
next assumed n = 13.
C. DETECTION AND PREDICTION PERFORMANCE
The inference model is based on counters that register the
number of transitions between hidden states and the number
of different types of SIP messages forming each SIP dia-
log. Consequently, the inference procedure is updated as the
information flows throughout each server, being computed
in real-time, which explains why the inference per se is not
critical for real-time prediction. We emphasize that the most
critical aspect to run the proposedmethodology in real-time is
Algorithm 1. To show the potential of the proposed solution
in terms of its real-time computation, we characterized the
computational time required to run the detection algorithm.
To this end we have run the detection algorithm for all SIP
dialogs included in the non-anomalous inference dataset. The
cumulative distribution function of the computation time is
presented in Fig. 6 for the non-anomalous dataset (similar
results were obtained for the anomalous dataset). As plot-
ted in Figure 6, approximately 65% of the SIP dialogs are
computed in less than 200 ms, showing the feasibility of the
detection algorithm in real-time.
The detection performance of EdC and MFdC was evalu-
ated for different sets of input sequences. Three new datasets
were defined with SIP dialogs copied from the inference
set: the dataset Kmost includes the 150 most likely unique
dialogs; the dataset Kless includes the 150 less probable
unique dialogs; and, the set Krandom includes 150 SIP dialogs
randomly chosen (in this case 100 random trials were consid-
ered). The detection performance obtained for the different
datasets is presented in Figure 7, showing the comparative
performance of both criteria for the less and themost probable
SIP dialogs of the inference dataset. The results show that
higher performance can be achieved with the MFdC. The
performance gap is bigger for less probable SIP dialogs (Kless
set), where the EdC achieved 96% of detection probability
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FIGURE 7. Detection probability for the Kmost , Kless, and Krandom
observed input sequence sets.
because the dialogs are less represented in the inference
dataset. Finally, the results obtained for the Krandom set are
similar to the ones in Figure 4.
Next, we characterize the prediction of all SIP mes-
sages contained in the inference dataset. In the experimental
methodology, we have considered that Ld observed input
sequences, i, are created from each SIP dialog in the inference
dataset. This means that for each dialog of length Ld we
obtain Ld observed input sequences as follows, i1 = <m(1)>,
i2 = <m(1),m(2)>, . . . , iLd = <m
(1),m(2), . . . ,m(Ld )>,
which represents a real-time interaction between two users as
the SIP messages are sent over time. To evaluate the number
of SIP messages needed to correctly predict the right SIP dia-
log the Viterbi Path, x, was computed for the 132855 i input
sequences obtained from the 18782 dialogs of the inference
dataset.
Figure 8 presents the prediction probability per length of
the observed input sequence (Lo). The prediction probabil-
ity was computed taking into consideration the number of
observed input sequences for which the SIP dialogs were
successfully predicted over the number of all input sequences
of equal length (the results were obtained with the MFdC, but
similar results were observed for the EdC). The results show
that the prediction probability increases with the length of
the observed input sequence, because the similarity between
the input sequence and known dialogs increases for longer
observed SIP sequences. However, this justification is not
entirely observed in the figure because the distribution of
the SIP dialogs’ length presented in Figure 3 must also be
taken into consideration. Based on the results in the figure,
the prediction performance can be analyzed for three dif-
ferent regions: Lo ≤ 5, 5 < Lo < 14, and Lo ≥ 14.
In the first region the prediction performance is low but for
Lo = 2 there is an increase of dialogs correctly predicted.
The result indicates that most of the dialogs with Ld = 3
only need 2 SIP messages to be correctly estimated. One
reason that supports this conclusion is the high occurrence
of these dialogs (see Figure 3) and the low number of
FIGURE 8. Prediction probability of SIP dialogs for different lengths of
the observed input sequence (MFdC).
unique dialogs with that length (see Figure 2). In the second
region the prediction probability increases with Lo, and for
Lo = 13 the prediction probability reaches 0.8182. However,
in the beginning of the third region the probability decreases
due to the higher occurrence of the dialogs with length
6 ≤ Ld ≤ 14, in comparison with the dialogs with length
above 14 (see Figure 3). Simultaneously, the number of
unique dialogs reaches the highest number when its length
is above 14 (see Figure 2). Finally, during the third region
the probability of correctly predicting a dialog increases
again with the length of the observed input sequence, achiev-
ing 1 when the input sequence is longer than 32.
While the previous results considered the prediction rate
according to the length of the observed input sequence, next
we characterize the prediction rate according to the amount
of information available to predict each dialog. Specifically,
we consider the ratio between the observed input sequence
length used in the prediction probability and the SIP dialog’s
length, i.e., Lo/Ld . The experiment has adopted the same
dataset used to obtain the results in Figure 8, but the predic-
tion algorithm was computed considering a single observa-
tion given by the first SIP message in the SIP dialog, two
observations given by the first two SIP messages in the SIP
dialog, and so on, until reaching the Ld SIP messages in the
SIP dialog.
The prediction results are presented in Figure 9 for the
MFdC and similar results are obtained for the EdC. The ratio
between the observed input sequence length over the SIP
dialog’s length is represented in percentage in the x-axis. For
Lo/Ld < 8.929% the prediction algorithm misdetects all
the dialogs by classifying them in a wrong type. In this case
the amount of observed information is not enough to predict
any SIP dialog. For Lo/Ld ≥ 8.929% the prediction prob-
ability of SIP dialogs increases with Lo/Ld , because more
information is observed and used in the prediction algorithm.
A maximum prediction percentage of 87.16% is achieved
for Lo/Ld= 98.21% and the detection probability, i.e., for
Lo/Ld = 100%, achieves 100%.
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FIGURE 9. SIP dialogs prediction probability over the amount of available
information (MFdC).
D. DETECTION OF UNKNOWN SIP DIALOGS
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the infer-
ence and detection scheme to detect unknown SIP dialogs,
which were inferred before. We highlight that unknown SIP
dialogs are detected whenever the computed Viterbi path is
null.
In the first experience, we have used the test dataset
using the k-fold cross-validation methodology described in
Subsection V-A. After running the inference model to learn
the inference dataset we have run the detection algorithm for
each unique SIP dialog of the test dataset using the MFdC
criterion. The detection algorithm has successfully classi-
fied 99.942% of the inferred SIP dialogs and misclassified
0.058%. The detection probability is in line with the detection
probability reported in Figure 9 for the inference dataset only.
Moreover, the computed Viterbi path was null for all SIP
dialogs that have not be inferred, i.e., for the unknown SIP
dialogs contained in the test datasets. This result confirms
the possibility of detecting all SIP dialogs not contained in
the inference datasets, which is a crucial feature to detect new
types of attacks.
Next, we highlight the advantage of online learning.
We consider the data contained in the anomalous dataset,
which contains 152 unique SIP dialogs not included in
the inference dataset. Initially, the emission and transition
matrices are updated according to the data contained in the
non-anomalous dataset. To evaluate the online learning we
randomly select SIP dialogs contained in the anomalous
dataset. Each dialog is then used in the inference model
described in Section III.B and the emission and transition
matrices are updated accordingly. Then the dialog is detected
using the algorithm proposed in Section IV. The goal is to
determine how many times (χ) each unknown SIP dialog
needs to be updated in the learning algorithm in Subsection
III.B before it can be successfully detected. In such a way we
characterize the benefit of adopting online learning and its
efficiency according to the required amount of prior learning
updates. The results in Table 2 characterize the online detec-
tion performance.
The first row of Table 2 indicates that approximately
96.6592% of the unknown SIP dialogs are successfully
detected after having been updated once when the EdC detec-
tion criterion is adopted. As can be seen for the EdC criterion
there are a few SIP dialogs that are not successfully detected
after being updated once, but they represent less than 4%of all
unknown dialogs. However, we show that the MFdC criterion
achieves higher performance, as it successfully detects all
unknown SIP dialogs after they have been updated once.
The results in Table 2 show that the proposed learning and
detection algorithms are capable of achieving high successful
detection rates even when the transmission and emission
matrices are only updated once, meaning that a SIP dialog
can be successfully detected after its first inference when the
MFdC criterion is adopted.
TABLE 2. Detection performance of the unknown SIP dialogs after being
inferred χ times before a successful detection.
Departing from the fact that the inference dataset can be
updated over time, and so the transition and emission matri-
ces, the detection of an unknown SIP dialog has to do with
the correct rejection of that dialog, since it was never inferred
before. Since none of the unknown SIP dialogs is contained
in the inference dataset, the correct rejection performance
of Algorithm 1 is enough to assess its capability of iden-
tifying SIP dialogs never observed before. In this way, the
SIP dialogs can be classified as possible vulnerabilities or
eventual dialogs that should be confirmed by domain experts
before being included in the inference dataset.
To evaluate the capacity of correct rejection, we have used
the inference dataset to obtain the transition and emission
matrices. Then the Algorithm 1 was run for all SIP dialogs
in the anomalous dataset. Each unknown SIP dialog was
used as the observed input sequence adopted in the algorithm
to evaluate if it was correctly rejected. In this experiment,
we have observed that the returned Viterbi path was always
empty, meaning that all anomalous SIP dialogs were correctly
rejected. This indicates the capacity to correctly reject all
anomalous SIP messages contained in the anomalous dataset,
indicating a correct rejection rate of 100%. Consequently,
the proposed methodology can be effectively used to detect
anomalous or unknown (non-inferred) SIP dialogs, attesting
the capability of the proposed algorithms to identify possible
vulnerable SIP dialogs never inferred before.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work has proposed a machine learning technique to
predict SIP dialogs as SIP signaling messages are observed
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over time. An inference model was proposed to associate the
already known SIP signaling patterns to the observed SIP
messages. The inference is used by a prediction algorithm to
compute the SIP signaling pattern given the set of observed
SIP messages. The algorithm is applied to a subset of the
state space, so we can address data sparsity efficiently. Exper-
imental results evaluate the detection and prediction perfor-
mance of the proposed methodology. We also present results
obtained for a dataset of anomalous SIP dialogs, not included
in the inference dataset, showing that the proposed method-
ology can accurately detect all the abnormal SIP sequences
in a short period of time. The experimental results demon-
strate the performance of the proposed solution, showing its
effectiveness in classifying anomalous SIP dialogs.
The proposed prediction methodology can be enriched
through the use of additional information contained in the
SIP packets of a specific dialog. The influence of the adop-
tion of more information in the performance of the pre-
diction performance and in the computational time will
be further investigated. As future work, we also plan to
assess the prediction performance and computation complex-
ity when adopting other prediction techniques, such as deep
learning.
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